Commodity price gains: speculation vs. fundamentals by Brett W. Fawley & Luciana Juvenal
This spring, Wal-Mart CEO Bill Simon readied shoppers for 
what he termed “serious” inflation:  “We’re seeing cost increases 
starting to come through at a pretty rapid rate.” 1
At the top of the list of cost-related pressures on prices of final 
goods are gains in underlying commodity prices.  Commodi-
ties—such as cotton, rubber, food, petroleum and metals—are 
the raw materials from which all final goods begin.  For many 
businesses, commodities represent the second-largest driver   
of variable cost, next to labor.  Steep, sustained increases in the 
cost of commodities materially affect the viability of businesses 
and even industries; often, these price increases must be passed 
through to consumers.
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Commodity Price Gains:       
Speculation vs. Fundamentals
By Brett Fawley and Luciana Juvenal
inflaTion
The heavy reliance of businesses on com-
modities is illustrated by the story of John 
Anton, founder and owner of Anton Sport, 
a wholesaler of athletic apparel in Tempe, 
Ariz.  Anton, who normally keeps on hand 
30 boxes of cotton T-shirts as inventory, 
was reported this February by The Wall 
Street Journal to be sitting on 2,500 boxes 
of cotton T-shirts, funded via a $300,000 
loan.
2  The impetus?  A 90 percent increase 
in the price of cotton over 2010.
Currently, commodity prices are making 
headlines as much for the size of the price 
increases as for the simultaneity of price 
hikes across all types of commodities.  
Figure 1 reveals that, prior to the global 
recession, upward price trends took hold in 
a variety of commodities.  The financial cri-
sis and ensuing recession induced an acute 
decline from the 2008 peak in prices.  But 
beginning in 2009, the prices of all types 
of commodities began to rise once again at 
astronomical rates.
This synchronization of price movements 
across a range of commodities has fostered, 
in part, the assertion that the commodity 
price boom is a bubble, driven primarily  
by near-zero interest rates and excessive 
speculation in commodity futures markets.   
The counter argument is that market fun-
damentals—supply and demand for  
the commodities themselves—can fully 
explain the price gains.  Ultimately, under-
standing the sources of the price gains is 
essential for determining the proper policy 
response, if any.  
Arguments for Market Fundamentals
In the absence of “irrational exuberance,” 
the price of any good or asset should be 
driven by supply and demand.  On both the 
supply and demand side of commodities, 
there is no shortage of shocks to explain, at 
least in part, recent price gains.
Negative Supply Shocks
For crops and many other commodities, 
annual production is largely at the discretion 
of Mother Nature.  With respect to agricul-
tural commodities, a combination of bad 
breaks from Mother Nature and stock-to-
use ratios at already historic lows seems to 
explain much of the price increases. 
Pre-existing stocks are a key source of 
stability in commodity markets.  When 
stocks are low relative to use, the market is 
less able to absorb pressures from supply 
disruptions or unexpected demand; the 
resulting pressure on prices is much stron-
ger.  A survey of commodities characterized 
by rising prices uncovers many stock-to-use 
ratios at historic lows.
In a report on the pre-recession spike 
in food prices, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
identified numerous reasons why stock 
levels have been falling by an average rate 
of 3.4 percent per year since the mid-1990s.
3  
Reasons included declines in the reserves 
held by public institutions, development 
of other less costly instruments of risk 
management, increases in the number of 
countries able to export, and improve-
ments in information and transportation 
technologies.  Further, the FAO found 
strong evidence that lower stock levels at 
the beginning of the marketing season were 
associated with higher prices throughout 
the season, implying initial conditions in 
“tight” markets matter.  Compounding this 
effect is further empirical evidence that the 
price impact of low stocks becomes magni-
fied when stocks reach critically low levels.
For all of these reasons, low stocks in 
food and other crops mean that the weather 
disruptions faced in 2010 were all that 
much more significant.  For example, the 
47 percent increase in wheat prices in 2010 
was largely attributable to drought in Russia 
and China and to floods in Canada and 
Australia.  High cotton prices can be traced, 
in part, to floods in China (the largest 
producer) and Pakistan (the fourth-largest 
producer).
In many cases, the high prices in one 
market have spilled into other markets 
because of the competition between crops 
for the same land and growing resources.  
Farmers are choosing to grow the crops 
that are in shortest supply with the highest 
prices, often introducing shortages in other 
displaced crops.Growth in Demand for Metals from China and India
FIGURE 2
source: International Monetary Fund (2010).
Co-Movement between Oil and Corn Prices
FIGURE 3
Co-Movement between Oil and Soy Prices
source: The Wall Street Journal
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Recent Commodity Price Growth
FIGURE 1
sources: The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg.
Note: the shaded area indicates the recession, as dated by 
the National Bureau of economic research.  
With respect to nonagricultural commodi-
ties, the challenge of suppliers is less a result 
of temporary negative shocks than it is a 
result of rapidly expanding global demand.  
Growing Demand
The convergence in income between devel-
oping and advanced countries represents a 
significant driver of demand growth for com-
modities:  Representative of the trend, more 
than 90 percent of the increased demand for 
agricultural commodities over recent years 
has originated in developing countries. 
For commodities such as metals, this 
additional demand can take time to fully 
accommodate.  Figure 2 reveals the incred-
ible pace at which demand for metals like 
aluminum and copper has grown in the two 
most populous emerging countries: China 
and India.  This huge demand growth is 
a major contributor to the International 
Copper Study Group’s findings that world-
wide demand for refined copper exceeded 
worldwide supply by 480,000 tons over the 
first nine months of 2010.
4  The mismatch 
between supply and demand has unsur-
prisingly taken a large toll on inventories, 
cutting them by more than half, from 1.1 
million tons in 2001 to 412,000 tons by 
September 2010.  
Continued strong growth in emerging 
countries, complemented by economic 
recovery in the United States, Japan and 
Europe, is expected to continue to put 
upward pressure on prices of metals.   
According to Bloomberg News, 13 of 14 
industry analysts who were surveyed 
expected a copper shortage this year.
While exploration and investment in  
mining operations are under way, much 
time and money will be required before  
by the anticipation of profiting from 
higher prices tomorrow. 
Commodity markets, however, do not 
meet the usual theoretical criteria for 
a bubble.  Arguments for a speculative 
bubble focus primarily on one market-
place for commodities: the futures 
market.  Commodity futures markets are 
where both commercial and noncommer-
cial traders can buy and sell standard-
ized contracts for delivery of a specified 
quantity of goods at a specified date in the 
future.  These contracts are short-term 
instruments that have few constraints on 
short-selling (betting on price decreases) 
and that are easy to arbitrage (profit risk-
free from mispricing).  In contrast, theory 
holds that bubbles are limited to markets 
such as real estate, where the good in 
question has a long lifespan, is hard to sell 
before you own, and buying and selling is 
costly in terms of time and money.
Still, some believe that a bubble is 
forming in commodities due to either 
expansionary U.S. monetary policy and/
or record flows of investment funds into 
commodity futures.  These possibilities 
warrant careful consideration. 
The Role of Expansionary  
U.S. Monetary Policy 
The primary means by which expan-
sionary monetary policy influences com-
modity prices is by decreasing the cost of 
holding inventories.  Anton, the apparel 
wholesaler, provides a good example.  
One component of the cost of holding 
inventory is the prevailing interest rate.  
Expanding inventory means borrow-
ing money, as in the case of Anton, or 
sacrificing the return that one could 
earn from investing the money.  Near-
zero interest rates, as currently exist in 
the United States, significantly decrease 
the cost of holding inventory and, thus, 
increase demand for commodities.  In 
this context, inventory buildups, such 
as Anton’s, can be interpreted as symp-
tomatic of overly loose monetary policy.  
Broad declines in aggregate commodity 
inventories, however, cast doubt on the 
current importance of this effect.
The quotation of international com-
modity prices in dollars opens a sec-
ond means for U.S. monetary policy in 
new mines are operational.  In the words 
of U.S. Geological Survey specialist Daniel 
Edelstein, “Mines aren’t just like factories, 
where you just flip a switch.” 
With respect to agricultural markets, the 
FAO is correct to point out that increased 
demand due to population and income 
growth is largely predictable.  Biofuels, 
however, are cited as a new and persistent 
shock to food demand.
5  Figure 3 reveals an 
unmistakable recent shift in the relationship 
between oil prices and the price of popular 
biofuel crops, such as corn (for ethanol) and 
soy (for biodiesel).  The enormous size of 
energy markets compared with agricultural 
markets means that energy-related demand 
is capable of absorbing near-limitless 
amounts of surplus crops, effectively placing 
a floor below food prices.  While great for 
farmers, this is unwelcome news for the 
impoverished and malnourished popula-
tions of the world.  The effect of biofuels 
is also not limited to crops used in their 
production.  Biofuel production represents 
an alternative use of land, which affects all 
agricultural products.
The outlook in oil markets, which drives 
demand for biofuels, is not particularly 
promising either.  According to a recent 
report from the International Monetary 
Fund, oil demand in emerging markets is 
quickly catching up to demand in advanced 
countries after years of significantly lower 
consumption rates by the former.
6  Com-
pounding this situation, production con-
straints in current exporting countries are 
starting to bind, as oil fields have reached 
maturity.  One source of relief may come in 
the form of shale oil, in which the United 
States is rich.  But extraction from shale will 
not become sustainable until the price of oil 
promises to stay above $80-105 a barrel.
7  
Overall, there is no doubt that fundamen-
tal shocks to supply and demand in com-
modities, both transitory and persistent, 
can account for significant price pressures 
in these markets.  Some, however, remain 
unconvinced that these fundamental shocks 
are enough to explain the entirety of price 
increases.  Instead, they place some blame 
on a bubble in commodity prices.
Arguments for a Bubble
An asset bubble is characterized by prices 
detached from fundamentals, instead driven To try to design policy around commodity prices would require 
abrupt about-faces and would detract from a central bank’s 
goal of bringing stability to markets.
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as Thailand, the largest producer of rubber, 
ultimately intervened to buy up domestic 
rubber supplies and support prices, while 
simultaneously telling farmers to restrict 
supplies in an effort to bid prices back up. 
Not only are large movements in commod-
ity prices common, but they are often linked 
to inherently unpredictable events.  Just in 
the past few months, cotton prices fell by 25 
percent and oil had its largest one-day drop 
in two years.  To try to design policy around 
commodity prices would require abrupt 
about-faces and would detract from a central 
bank’s goal of bringing stability to markets. 






consideration global economic conditions?
Some countries, like India, have already 
begun to regulate commodity futures mar-
kets; other countries, including the United 
States, have debated the issue.  Both those 
who believe in a speculative commodity 
bubble and those who do not can agree that 
properly functioning commodity futures 
markets are integral to the real economy 
because they allow those who do not wish to 
hold the risk of future price movements to 
sell that risk to willing parties.  The OECD 
report provides a reminder that index fund 
investors are an important source of liquid-
ity and of risk absorption for these markets.  
Pushing such investors out of the market 
could result in huge costs, which must be 
weighed against the evidence that their 
activity is hindering, and not enhancing,  
the proper functioning of these markets. 
With respect to biofuels, potential 
negative effects, such as reversing a 30-year 
downward trend in real food prices, are of 
particular relevance because these markets 
are currently highly dependent on govern-
ment subsidies.  Brazil’s ethanol from sugar 
cane is the only biofuel whose production is 
viable without government subsidies.  In the 
United States, subsidies on ethanol increase 
the price that processors can afford to pay 
for corn and break even (a function of oil 
prices) by $63 per ton.  This compares with 
an average price of corn in 2005 (predating 
heavy investments in biofuel) of $75 per ton 
and a price of $163 per ton that processors 
can already afford to pay and break even 
given crude oil prices of $100 per barrel. 
Government support of the industry is 
motivated by benefits, such as energy inde-
pendence and a reduction in the environ-
mental impact, that accrue to society but 
cannot be internalized by processors.  But 
recent life-cycle analysis of biofuels—an 
analysis that takes into account the extra 
land needed to grow crops and the produc-
tion process—raises questions about the 
environmental benefits.  The question is 
whether there may be less-costly and more-
efficient ways to achieve the same policy 
goals.  The long-run success of biofuels is 
likely to hinge on the development of sec-
ond-generation fuels, which can make use 
of more parts of the crop, as well as biofuels 
based on highly efficient algae. 
The final question regarding the consider-
ation of global economic conditions in U.S. 
monetary policy debate will require much 
more convincing evidence before a firm 
conclusion can be reached.  If expansionary 
U.S. monetary policy is transmitted glob-
ally to economies in danger of overheating, 
which in turn bids up commodity prices 
and, hence, increases price levels back at 
home, then U.S. monetary policy should 
care about output gaps around the world.  
At the same time, the mere correlation of 
commodity price increases with loose U.S. 
monetary policy, without any convincing 
empirical evidence or theoretical mecha-
nisms for this avenue, is not enough to 
determine that U.S. policy decisions should 
factor in economic conditions from Latin 
America to Europe, from Asia to Africa.  
Ultimately, the greatest lesson from recent 
trends in commodity prices may be the 
reminder that economics is founded on the 
assumption of a world with unlimited wants 
and limited resources.  A world with a grow-
ing population and ever-increasing income 
parity implies a world with ever-increasing 
competition for resources. 
Luciana Juvenal is an economist and Brett 
Fawley is a senior research associate, both  
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/juvenal/  
for more on Juvenal’s work.
ENDNOTES
 1 See O’Donnell. 
 2 See Pleven and Wirz.
 3 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (2009).
 4 See Davis.
 5  See Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (2008).
 6  See International Monetary Fund (2011).
 7  See Engemann and Owyang.
 8  “Long-only” refers to the fact that these index 
funds make only buy and sell decisions and do 
not short futures contracts.
 9  See Senate Report 109-65.
 10  See Irwin and Sanders.
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particular to influence commodity prices.  
When the dollar depreciates, goods priced 
in dollars become more affordable to foreign 
consumers, all else equal leading them to 
increase consumption and bid up the prices 
on these goods.  This argument is countered, 
however, by the observation that commod-
ity prices rose significantly over recent years 
regardless of the currency quoted in. 
The rather recent argument that has been 
put forth is that historically low U.S. inter-
est rates have increased commodity prices 
by driving investment funds into other 
markets, including the financial markets of 
emerging countries, to seek higher returns.  
The evidence, however, is founded mostly 
on correlation and largely lacks a credible 
transmission mechanism.  Completing the 
theory of how an inflow of capital to emerg-
ing markets inflates commodity prices 
requires a link between the inflow of foreign 
investment and a broad expansion in emerg-
ing market credit.  Ultimately, the banking 
systems of the developing countries receiv-
ing the influxes of capital must transmit the 
funds into the general economy.  But the 
skepticism that developing countries like 
Brazil, Thailand and Indonesia have shown 
toward much of the capital inflows, labeling 
the funds as “hot money” seeking short-
term returns, places uncertainty over the 
extent that capital inflows are funding bid-
ups in commodity prices among developing 
countries. 
The impact of increased speculation 
in commodity futures markets, perhaps 
exacerbated by low traditional investment 
returns, has been an area of intense research 
in recent years, however.  
The Potential Costs  
of Excessive Speculation
Just as well-documented as the large gains 
in commodity prices prior to the recession  
is the contemporaneous large influx of 
capital into the commodity markets, namely 
in long-only index funds.
8  According to 
Barclay’s, index fund investment in com-
modities increased from $90 billion in early 
2006 to just under $200 billion by the end 
of 2007.  The proposed link between large 
flows of capital into commodity markets 
and increases in current prices appeals to 
common sense:  Speculative demand for 
commodity-based assets increases demand 
for the underlying commodity, increasing  
its price.  A second practically founded 
rationale for why excessive speculation  
must have played a role in rising commodity 
prices is embodied by a U.S. Senate com-
mittee staff report in 2006: “The traditional 
forces of supply and demand cannot fully 
account for [energy price] increases.” 
9 
Despite these straightforward proposi-
tions, however, the true impact of specu-
lative inflows on underlying commodity 
prices remains debatable.  A technical 
report prepared for the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) offers a useful examination of the 
research done on both sides.
10  In particular, 
the authors pointed out both logical and fac-
tual inconsistencies within the argument for 
a speculation-induced bubble in commod-
ity prices.  Logical inconsistencies include 
a tenuous link between speculative inflows 
and demand for the underlying commodity 
and doubt over the extent that index fund 
investors could artificially increase futures 
and cash prices while only participating in 
the futures market and not the spot market, 
where commodities are sold for immediate 
delivery.  Factual inconsistencies are numer-
ous.  For example, inventories should have 
risen between 2006 and 2008 according 
to the bubble theory, but they actually fell.  
Other reasons for discounting this theory 
include:  
•	 arbitraging	index-fund	buying	is	fairly	
easy due to its predictable nature,
•	 commodity	prices	rose	in	markets	with	
and without index funds,
•	 speculation	was	not	excessive	after	
accounting for hedging demand, and 
•	 price	impacts	across	markets	were	not	
consistent for the same level of index  
fund activity. 
In addition to their own analysis, the 
authors of the OECD report reviewed four 
studies supporting a pre-recession com-
modity bubble and five studies discounting 
a bubble.  The authors concluded that “the 
weight of the evidence at this point in time 
clearly tilts in favor of the argument that 
index funds did not cause a bubble in com-
modity futures prices.”  Of the studies  
supporting a bubble, they write, “These 
studies are subject to a number of important 
criticisms that limit the degree of confidence 
one can place in their results.”  Still, the 
OECD report contains an important caveat 
regarding the markets most often linked to a 
speculative bubble: “The evidence is weaker 
in the two energy markets studied because 
of considerable uncertainty about the degree 
to which the available data actually reflect 
index trader positions in these markets.”
Sorting out the bubble arguments has 
extremely important policy implications 
going forward.
Are Policy Responses Required  
in Commodity Markets?
The most important thing to remember 
with respect to commodity markets is that 
they are volatile.  The traditional decision 
of central banks to focus on core inflation, 
which excludes food and energy, is easy to 
understand in the context of recent move-
ment in rubber markets.  
During 2010, the price of rubber 
increased by 114 percent.  The run-up in 
the price was largely attributed to bad 
weather, low stocks and growing demand 
from China’s automobile industry.  Around 
the end of 2010, many investors remained 
bullish on rubber prices due to expecta-
tions of continuing strong demand.  Indeed, 
the real price of rubber reached a historic 
peak in the middle of this February.  Yet 
only a month removed from that peak, the 
price fell more than 30 percent in a mat-
ter of weeks, and the Thai government was 
discussing price supports for rubber.  The 
price drop was due to uncertainty over 
global demand, stemming first from unrest 
in the Middle East and, subsequently, the 
earthquake and resulting tsunami in Japan 
and their uncertain effects on the demand 
for rubber tires from Japanese carmakers 
like Toyota, Honda and Nissan.  This drop 
was then followed by a 23 percent increase 
in the price over the second half of March 